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FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT:
ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS
PROTECTED?
ERIC JUERGENS †
INTRODUCTION
A book author is permitted to observe the training of a group
of Navy aviators as they learn the intricacies of flying a highpowered fighter jet. 1 During this training, one of the pilots, Mary
Louise commits serious errors, including aligning her aircraft
with the wrong runway and causing another pilot to take evasive
action while flying in formation. 2 The Navy launches an
investigation into whether Mary Louise should continue to fly,
producing hearings and documentary evidence, and ultimately,
Mary Louise is allowed to keep her position. 3 The book this
author later releases quotes from the negative reports on Mary
Louise that the Navy had permitted him to see. 4 Mary Louise
sues the Navy for violations of the Privacy Act for releasing her
private information without her consent. 5 This may seem like a
fairly obvious and egregious violation of the Privacy Act, but the
inquiry is not nearly that simple. Indeed, she may not even be
able to bring the suit because she is a member of the United
States Armed Forces. 6
†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.S., University of Delaware, 2008. A special thanks to
Vice Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his guidance and encouragement in
writing this Note. I dedicate this Note to my late grandfather, a United States Coast
Guard veteran, who never stopped learning.
1
See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002). This
case is discussed in more detail below. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
2
See Brief for Appellee at 2, Cummings, 279 F.3d 1051 (Nos. 00-5348, 98-1183).
3
See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1052–53.
4
See id. at 1053.
5
See id. The Privacy Act, as discussed infra Part I.B, essentially states that an
agency cannot disclose any record without the written consent of the individual to
whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011).
6
Her claim may be barred because of the Feres doctrine, which is discussed in
great detail below. The Feres doctrine bars claims by members of the military
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The Privacy Act protects individuals from the release of
confidential records by the United States government without
that person’s consent. 7 Not everyone, however, is so protected.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Uhl v. Swanstrom
barred Privacy Act claims by members of the military, 8 while the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Cummings v.
Department of the Navy allowed such a claim. 9 This Note
suggests that, upon close scrutiny, these two seemingly
irreconcilable decisions are actually in accord with each other
and in harmony with the congressional intent of the Privacy Act.
The United States Armed Forces rely on an all-volunteer
force to accomplish the military missions of this nation and
protect its citizens from harm at home and abroad. 10 The
military has long been subject to a system of justice different
from that which the general citizens are subject. 11 This alternate
system of justice governed soldiers during World War I and
World War II, even though many of them were drafted into
service. 12 In response to the astonishing number of courtsmartial during World War II, Congress passed the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). 13 This legislation, implemented
through executive orders, formed the Manual for Courts-Martial
(“MCM”) and was a major revision of the law governing the
military. 14 The preamble to the MCM states its objectives: “The
purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces,
to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of

against the United States government for various torts and other causes of action.
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); infra Part I.A.
7
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b).
8
See 79 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 1996).
9
See 279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
10
See Military Justice Fact Sheets: The Military Justice System, U.S. MARINE
CORPS,
http://www.marines.mil/unit/judgeadvocate/Documents/JAM/Mil_Justice_
Materials/Resources/MJFACTSHTS.htm#Military%20Justice (last visited Mar. 26,
2011) [hereinafter U.S. MARINE CORPS].
11
See id.
12
Id. There were approximately two million courts-martial during World War II.
Id.
13
Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006 & Supp. I 2010).
14
See U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 10.
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the United States.” 15 Since the military is governed by this
alternate justice system, the question thus arises whether
members of the military, or the military branches themselves,
are subject to more general civil laws such as the Federal Torts
Claim Act (“FTCA”), 16 Bivens claims, 17 and the Privacy Act. 18
Despite the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA, the
Supreme Court prohibited members of the military from bringing
claims under the FTCA. This bar began in Feres v. United
States, 19 where, as explored below, the Court held, in a ruling
now known as the Feres doctrine, that “the Government is not
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.” 20 After Feres, the Supreme Court
extended the Feres doctrine beyond its original scope, and the
rationales behind the doctrine evolved. Claims for injuries that
“arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service”
are prohibited. 21 Such a service-related claim must, according to
United States v. Johnson, be barred because it “necessarily
implicates the military judgments and decisions that are
inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military
mission.” 22
Over the next few decades, the Feres doctrine expanded
beyond personal injury claims and became relevant in the
context of privacy. In 1974, amidst concerns over an increased
threat to personal privacy because federal agencies increasingly
used computers to store and retrieve information, Congress
enacted the Privacy Act. 23 This Act compels notice of systems of
records, requires the opportunity to amend inaccurate records,

JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES pt. I, at 1 (2008 ed.), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/
documents/mcm2008.pdf.
16
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
17
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
18
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011).
19
340 U.S. 135 (1950).
20
Id. at 146.
21
Id.
22
481 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1987).
23
See John F. Joyce, The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield But Sometimes
Neither, 99 MIL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1983). There was also unease about the increasing
computerization of sensitive personal data and the potential for abuse by the
government, including possible secret systems of records. See id.
15
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and protects the “individual’s interest in limiting the
government’s
acquisition
and
disclosure
of
personal
information.” 24
Currently, there appears to be a circuit split on whether the
Feres doctrine is applicable to claims based on violations of the
Privacy Act.
In Uhl v. Swanstrom, the Eighth Circuit
determined that the Feres doctrine did apply to the Privacy Act,
barring the claims asserted. 25 Affirming the district court’s
determination, the court stated that it was “equally reluctant, yet
legally bound, to hold that plaintiff’s claims in the present case
are non-justiciable under the Feres doctrine.” 26 Six years later, in
Cummings v. Department of the Navy, 27 the D.C. Circuit held
that the Feres doctrine was not a bar to Privacy Act claims. 28
The court held that it did not have to “ ‘enlarge’ by any stretch
the Privacy Act’s purview in order for the statute to avoid the
effects of the Feres doctrine.” 29 The court indicated that none of
the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court, such as the
effect on military discipline and decisionmaking, were implicated
in a lawsuit under the Privacy Act. 30 The Eastern District of
New York recently highlighted this issue in MacQuill v. Killian, 31
where the court documented the apparent split in circuits and
sided with the D.C. Circuit, allowing Privacy Act claims
notwithstanding the Feres doctrine. 32
This Note contends that Uhl and Cummings are actually in
harmony, and therefore, the Feres doctrine should apply to bar
some claims under the Privacy Act, but not others. Claims by
military personnel under the Privacy Act should be barred when
the records are released solely within the military structure
because the release is truly “incident to service” and invokes the
rationales of the Feres doctrine. In cases where the military
Id. at 126–27.
79 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 1996). Uhl claimed violations of due process and
equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552a, and a pendent state law claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 752.
26
Id. at 755 (adopting the rationale of the district court).
27
279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
28
See id. at 1058.
29
Id. at 1055.
30
See id. at 1055–56. For an extensive description of the rationales underlying
the doctrine see discussion infra Part I.A, II.B.
31
No. 07-CV-1566 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).
32
See id. at 10–12.
24
25

CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)

2011]

FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT

7/14/2011 4:15 PM

317

releases a serviceperson’s records to persons outside the military,
however, the rationales of Feres are not applicable and should
not bar recovery. Part I explores the background of the Feres
doctrine and its progeny and discusses the Privacy Act in
general. Part II highlights the two circuit court decisions, Uhl v.
Swanstrom 33 and Cummings v. Department of the Navy34 and
their apparent conflict. This Part also analyzes the rationales
that underlie the doctrine and the normative arguments for and
against the continued use of the doctrine and its expansion to
Privacy Act claims. Part III proposes that the Supreme Court
consider a new test. First, the Court should look at whether the
release of records occurs incident to service and should focus on
the recipient of the released information. If the information
protected by the Privacy Act was released within the military
command structure, and thus subject to the rules and regulations
of the military, the claims should be barred. But, if the release is
made to an outside civilian party, then the claims should be
allowed. This approach would protect military discipline and
decisionmaking while still giving plaintiffs a remedy in
appropriate cases.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FERES DOCTRINE AND
THE PRIVACY ACT

The Feres doctine is a major aspect of the law governing the
military, barring many tort claims. 35 The Feres doctrine has just
begun to intersect with the Privacy Act, an act that seeks to
Part A discusses sovereign
protect individual’s records. 36
immunity and the wide-scale waiver by Congress in the FTCA in
general. It then examines the evolution of the Feres doctrine
from a principle that barred some claims by military personnel
under the FTCA to one that withdraws nearly all judicial inquiry
in the area. Finally, this Part discusses the arguments that the
Court has made in support of and against the doctrine, earning
both the approval and condemnation of the doctrine by

33
34
35
36

79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 1996).
279 F.3d 1051.
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011).
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commentators. Part B offers an overview of the Privacy Act, its
various provisions, and its civil and criminal remedies.
A.

The Development of the Feres Doctrine

The United States’ doctrine of sovereign immunity has its
roots in English law, which prohibited suit against the King
without his consent. 37 In Chisholm v. Georgia, 38 the Supreme
Court allowed for suits against states, rejecting the English
notion of sovereign immunity. 39 The Eleventh Amendment was
adopted in response to Chisholm and effectively overturned the
decision. 40
The Eleventh Amendment, however, is silent on whether the
United States is immune from suit. The Supreme Court, in
Cohens v. Virginia, 41 interpreted the Eleventh Amendment and
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to also bar suits against the
United States. 42 As a result of this immunity, Congress required
individuals to petition Congress for a private bill that would

37
See Christopher G. Froelich, Comment, Closing the Equitable Loophole:
Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable
Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 701–02 (2005); see also
Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2007). See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963) (discussing the concept of
sovereign immunity and its development from English law).
38
2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
39
Id. at 472, 479 (upholding federal jurisdiction of a suit by an individual
against a state); Brou, supra note 37.
40
See Brou, supra note 37. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment was extended
in Hans v. Louisiana to confer sovereign immunity on the states from suit by a
citizen of the state in federal court even when the claim is based on federal law or
the Constitution. See 134 U.S. 1, 15, 20–21 (1890). The current interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment by the Supreme Court would require it to read:
No state may be sued in federal court by any person or foreign government
unless the state consents to the suit or Congress has clearly and
unequivocally abrogated this immunity by exercise of its powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For purposes of this amendment a
state official is not a state unless the remedy sought against a state official
would require the state to pay compensation for past actions.
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 122 (3d
ed. 2009).
41
19 U.S. 264 (1821).
42
See Brou, supra note 37; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. at 411–12.
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provide redress from the federal government. 43 This process
eventually proved to be inadequate because of the volume of
claims received. 44 Finally, Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946
and effectively waived sovereign immunity for a wide variety of
tort claims. 45 In short, the current version of the FTCA provides
that “[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual in like circumstances, but
shall not be liable for . . . punitive damages.” 46
The relationship between the military and the United States
government’s liability under the FTCA was first examined in
Brooks v. United States. 47 In that case, Brooks had been riding in
an automobile, which was struck by an Army truck driven by a
Brooks and his father were seriously
civilian employee. 48
injured, and his brother was killed. 49 The government contended
that recovery should be barred because Brooks and his brother
were in the armed services at the time of the accident. 50 In this
case of first impression, the Court rejected the government’s
interpretation of the FTCA and held that the brothers could
recover because they had been off-duty, on leave, and in a civilian
automobile at the time the accident occurred. 51 The Court,
however, noted that “[w]ere the accident incident to the Brooks’
service, a wholly different case would be presented.” 52
The Court considered such a “wholly different case” less
than a year later. That case, Feres v. United States, established
the exclusion of claims by members of the military. 53 Feres
consolidated three cases brought under the FTCA. 54 In one case,
See R. Matthew Molash, Note, If You Can’t Save Us, Save Our Families: The
Feres Doctrine and Servicemen’s Kin, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 317, 319–20.
44
See id. at 320 (discussing the Court of Claims and the development of the
private bill process).
45
See Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 534–35 (1947).
46
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
47
337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 50–52. The Court had never before confronted a case under the FTCA
by a member of the armed forces. See Jon F. Arnold, Note, Kitowski v United States:
Another Military Injury Is Written off as “Incident to Service,” 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 469,
470 (1992).
52
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52.
53
340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
54
Id. at 136.
43
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the decedent perished in a barracks fire while on duty, and his
executrix alleged that the military was negligent for housing him
in barracks known to be unsafe due to a defective heating system
and for failure to keep a sufficient fire watch. 55 The second case
involved a soldier who underwent surgery and eight months later
endured another operation where “a towel 30 inches long by 18
inches wide, marked ‘Medical Department U.S. Army,’ was
discovered and removed from his stomach.” 56 The Plaintiff
alleged that the army surgeon negligently left the towel in his
abdomen. 57 The third case alleged that the decedent died
“because of negligent and unskillful medical treatment by army
surgeons.” 58
The only question presented to the Court was whether the
FTCA extended to injuries that were incurred “incident
to . . . service.” 59 The Court discussed the legislative history of
the FTCA and the “long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of
sovereign immunity from suit.” 60 Nonetheless, the Court held, in
a ruling now known as the Feres doctrine, that “the Government
is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where
the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.” 61
The Court identified three rationales for its decision to
exclude claims by members of the military against the U.S.
government. The first rationale was based on the theory of
The Supreme Court reasoned that a
double recovery. 62
comprehensive system of benefits already existed for members of
the military and their families and that allowing suits would

Id. at 136–37 (discussing the Feres case).
Id. at 137 (relating the facts of the Jefferson case).
57
Id.
58
Id. (recounting the facts of the Griggs case).
59
Id. at 138.
60
Id. at 139. The Court acknowledged that there are not any committee reports
or floor debates to aid in the interpretation of the statute. Id. at 138. The Court,
however, recognized that there was a remedy if they did not properly interpret the
statute—Congress could clarify what it meant with a new law. Id. Special
significance was paid to the fact that “eighteen tort claims bills were introduced in
Congress between 1925 and 1935 and all but two expressly denied recovery to
members of the armed forces.” Id. at 139. The FTCA does define an employee of the
government to include members of the armed forces. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
61
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
62
See id. at 140; Brou, supra note 37, at 15.
55
56
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provide a double recovery for successful plaintiffs. 63 Essentially,
these injuries were better handled by the Veterans’
Administration (“VA”) compensation system, which is analogous
to a no-fault workers’ compensation system. 64 This system
provides for “simple, certain, and uniform compensation for
injuries or death of those in armed services.” 65
The second rationale the Court discussed was the lack of
analogous liability of a private individual. 66 Here, the Court
looked at the language of the FTCA which states that “[t]he
United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 67
This language presented a problem for plaintiffs because there
was no corresponding liability for a private individual, and “no
American law . . . has permitted a soldier to recover for
negligence, against either his superior officers or the
Government.” 68 In addition, even if the term “individual” in the
FTCA was defined to include the states, no state allowed for suits
by members of its militia. 69
The third rationale the Court cited was the desire to avoid
forcing state law on a federal relationship. The Court reasoned
that “[t]he relationship between the Government and members of
its armed forces is ‘distinctively federal in character,’ ” and thus,
if soldiers could sue, state law would be imposed onto that
relationship. 70 As a result, “sheer luck of assignment” in a
specific geographical area would determine the recovery a soldier
could receive, if any at all, because it would be based on state
These resulting inconsistencies “would disrupt the
law. 71

63
See Feres, 340 U.S. at 140 (“The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a
remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.”).
64
Id. at 145; see also Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the
Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003) (discussing the “[a]vailability of [v]eterans’ [b]enefits
and [c]ompensation”).
65
Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
66
Id. at 141; see Brou, supra note 37, at 16.
67
Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (second alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(2006)).
68
Id.
69
See id. at 142.
70
Id. at 143–44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305
(1947), superseded by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651–2653 (2006)).
71
Brou, supra note 37, at 16; see also Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–43.
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uniformity necessary to the effective operation of the armed
forces.” 72
Following Feres, the “incident to service” test became the
most important aspect in determining whether a military
plaintiff could recover against the government. This test is vital
because the Court in Feres distinguished Brooks v. United States
on the grounds that “[t]he injury to Brooks did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty.” 73 Similarly, Feres held that The
Military Personnel Claims Act 74 specifically excluded recovery
when the injury occurred “incident to their service.” 75 The
“incident to service” test was the most effective way to delineate
those claims that could proceed and those that were barred.
Thus, “[t]he ‘incident to service’ test . . . provides a line that is
relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive
inquiry into military matters.” 76
1.

Post-Feres Expansion of the Doctrine

After Feres, the Court further developed both the “incident to
service” test and the Feres doctrine. For example, in United
States v. Brown, the Court allowed members of the military
whose injuries were sustained after their departure from the
military to recover under the FTCA. 77 In Brown, the Plaintiff
injured his leg on active duty, but did not suffer permanent nerve
damage until after his discharge when he had surgery at a VA
hospital. 78 The Court applied Brooks and allowed the action

72
Brou, supra note 37, at 16; see also Turley, supra note 64, at 12–15
(comparing the Court’s desire for uniformity with the non-uniformity it actually
creates).
73
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. Brooks was the first case decided under the FTCA with
military plaintiffs and allowed recovery. See Arnold, supra note 51. Therefore, to bar
recovery in Feres, the Court needed either to distinguish or overrule Brooks, and it
chose to distinguish the injuries in Brooks as not “incident to service.” See Feres, 340
U.S. at 146.
74
31 U.S.C. § 223b (1952), repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53(b),
70A Stat. 641.
75
Feres, 340 U.S. at 144 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 223b).
76
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987).
77
348 U.S. 110, 112–13 (1954) (applying the Feres rationales: (1) no analogous
liability for private individuals, (2) veteran’s benefits were not made an exclusive
remedy by Congress, and (3) the fact that there would be no impact on military
discipline because Brown was no longer on active duty or subject to military
discipline).
78
See id. at 110–11.
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because the injury was sustained after his discharge, and
therefore was not incident to service. 79
Additionally, the Court expanded the Feres doctrine to bar
third-party indemnification claims. In Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States, a National Guard member’s ejection seat
malfunctioned during an in-air emergency, and he was
permanently injured. 80 The Plaintiff received a lifetime disability
pension, but sued the United States government and Stencel,
claiming that their negligence caused the seat malfunction. 81
Stencel, who had manufactured the seat in accordance with the
parameters required by the United States, cross-claimed against
the United States, seeking indemnity if it were ordered to pay
the Plaintiff. 82 The Supreme Court applied Feres and held “that
the third-party indemnity action in this case is unavailable for
essentially the same reasons that the direct action by [Plaintiff]
is barred by Feres.” 83 These reasons include: (1) the “distinctively
federal” nature of the relationship between the United States and
its suppliers, (2) a comprehensive compensation system that
limits the tort liability exposure of the United States, and (3) the
effect on military discipline even though a third party is bringing
the claim. 84
The Supreme Court next considered whether the Feres
doctrine barred claims for violations of constitutional rights in
Chappell v. Wallace, 85 which involved a Bivens action 86 seeking
non-statutory damages. Five enlisted men in the United States
Navy claimed “that because of their minority race [their officers]
failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave
them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of

See id. at 113.
431 U.S. 666, 667–68 (1977).
81
See id. at 668 (alleging that both parties were liable individually and jointly
even though plaintiff was receiving $1,500 a month in a lifetime pension award
pursuant to the Veterans’ Benefit Act).
82
See id.
83
Id. at 673.
84
See id. at 672–73.
85
462 U.S. 296, 297 (1983).
86
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396–97 (1971) (allowing for a suit for damages to be brought against federal
officials whose actions violated a person’s constitutional rights, even though
Congress had not authorized such a suit). The Court cautioned that a remedy would
not be available if there were “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress.” Id. at 396.
79
80
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unusual severity.” 87
These actions allegedly resulted in a
deprivation of their constitutional rights. 88 The Court barred
their claim because “the unique disciplinary structure of the
military establishment and Congress’ activity in the field
constitute ‘special factors’ which dictate that it would be
inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivenstype remedy against their superior officers.” 89
In the cases following Feres, the Court gradually repudiated
many of the rationales for barring claims under the FTCA that it
had originally identified. Instead, the Court began to focus on a
single rationale: a desire to avoid a judicial intrusion into
military matters by calling into question military discipline and
decisionmaking. 90 The Court made this shift explicit in United
States v. Shearer, 91 where the government was sued for negligent
hiring after a soldier, who had previously been convicted of
manslaughter in Germany, murdered another soldier. 92 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that while Feres was based on a
variety of rationales, it was best explained by the
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort

Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297.
See id.
89
Id. at 304. This decision was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Stanley, when the Court ruled that a Bivens-type monetary damage remedy
was unavailable to military plaintiffs because of the special factors that Chappell
discussed. 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987). The Court applied the “incident to service” to
bar the Bivens remedy. Id. at 684. Here, a further factor was “not the fact that
Congress has chosen to afford some manner of relief in the particular case, but the
fact that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is
inappropriate.” Id. at 683. The Court in Stanley also clarified the types of relief that
would be available, saying that their statement that the court had “ ‘never held, nor
do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts
for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service’ ” had been
misinterpreted. Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). Instead, the Court explained
that it was referring to injunctive or equitable relief and not money damages. See id.
90
See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see also Brou, supra note
37, at 18–20 (discussing the focus on military discipline in a few Supreme Court
cases).
91
473 U.S. 52 (1985).
92
See id. at 53–54.
87
88
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Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty. 93

Specifically, the Court held:
To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding
officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian
court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary
decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident
or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and
how to place restraints on a soldier’s off-base conduct.
But . . . such “complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to
the composition, training, . . . and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments.” 94

Then again, this was not the first time that the Court
acknowledged its reluctance to make judicial inquiries into
matters of military discipline or decisionmaking. In using
Chappell’s “incident to service” test, the Court said “The special
status of the military has required, the Constitution
contemplated, Congress has created and this Court has long
recognized two systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for
civilians and one for military personnel.” 95 Likewise, in Stencel,
the Court acknowledged that a “trial would . . . involve secondguessing military orders, and would often require members of the
Armed Services to testify in court as to each other’s decisions and
actions.” 96 The Court did not want to become involved with this
potential disruption to the military and its ability to function
effectively.
The Court’s unwillingness to interfere with military
discipline and decisionmaking was prominent in the last two
decisions regarding the application of the Feres doctrine. In
United States v. Johnson, 97 Johnson’s widow filed suit under the
FTCA alleging that FAA flight controllers acted negligently after
her husband’s Coast Guard helicopter, under FAA radar control,
crashed into the side of a mountain. 98 The Supreme Court
Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)).
Id. at 58 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302).
95
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303–04.
96
Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
97
481 U.S. 681 (1987).
98
Id. at 683. Johnson, a helicopter pilot, was searching for a lost boat. Id. at
682–83. “The FAA . . . assumed positive radar control over the helicopter” after
inclement weather caused a drop in visibility. Id. at 683. “Shortly thereafter, the
helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain” and killed all crew members aboard.
Id.
93
94

CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)

326

7/14/2011 4:15 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:313

applied the Feres doctrine and barred the claim because the
death occurred “incident to service,” 99 which is “the ‘type[ ] of
claim[ ] that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary
in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline
and effectiveness.’ ” 100 The Court stated that the military is a
unique, distinctive culture that “must foster instinctive
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps” in order to
carry out its missions. 101 Discipline is essential to the military
accomplishing its missions and involves “duty and loyalty to one’s
service and to one’s country.” 102 In fact, “[s]uits brought by
service members against the government for service-related
injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective
service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline
in the broadest sense of the word.” 103
Underscoring the disagreement on the doctrine, Justice
Scalia dissented and argued that the doctrine should not apply
here because a civilian, and not the military, was negligent. 104
He pointed out that the Court discarded its original rationales
because they were insufficient to support the doctrine. 105
Instead, the entire Feres doctrine rested on the weak “military
discipline” rationale. 106
In its final decision on the Feres doctrine, the Court
confirmed its commitment to abstaining from involvement in
military discipline and decisionmaking. Justice Scalia authored
the majority opinion in United States v. Stanley 107 and used Feres
Id. at 692 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). The
main issue in this case was whether the Feres doctrine would apply even though the
negligence alleged was on the part of a civilian agency. Id. at 682.
100
Id. at 690 (quoting Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
101
Id. at 691 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 698.
106
See id. at 694–700 (articulating the three rationales that were originally
relied on in Feres and the fourth, military discipline, which was later added by the
Court and has increasingly been the rationale relied on).
107
483 U.S. 669 (1987). In Stanley, the plaintiff “volunteered to participate in a
program . . . to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment as
defenses against chemical warfare.” Id. at 671. Instead, he was secretly
administered LSD and years later suffered from hallucinations, which often caused
him to beat his wife and child in the middle of the night without the ability to recall
it. Id. Stanley sued and the Supreme Court barred his claims because of the Feres
doctrine. Id. at 683–84, 686.
99
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to bar a Bivens-type claim for damages. 108 The Court focused on
the impact of litigation on military discipline and
decisionmaking, noting that “Congress . . . ‘ha[s] exercised [its]
authority to establis[h] a comprehensive internal system of
justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special
patterns that define the military structure.’ ” 109 Therefore, the
Court withdrew from these military matters because such cases
would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled
depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning
the details of their military commands. Even putting aside the
risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which would becloud
military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at correct
conclusions would disrupt the military regime. 110

The Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the
Feres doctrine since its decision in Stanley. New issues, however,
arise when the military releases its personnel’s information.
B. The Privacy Act
The courts originally recognized the individual right to
privacy as a common law tort. This individual right first received
some attention in Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead
v. United States, 111 when he said, “The [framers] conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.” 112 The Supreme Court initially recognized a constitutional
right to privacy in 1965 113 and has since refined it in a variety of
areas. 114 Indeed, the right to privacy has moved out of case law
and has been codified by Congress. 115 One major statute that
governs information maintained by the federal government is the
Id. at 683–84.
Id. at 679 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 302 (1983)).
110
Id. at 682–83.
111
277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
113
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965) (describing how the
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights contain “peripheral rights,” which include
the right to privacy, and protects the interests of married persons in using
contraceptives).
114
See Joyce, supra note 23, at 115 n.12 (collecting cases dealing with the right
to privacy).
115
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2011); 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006) (“Right to
Financial Privacy Act”).
108
109
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Privacy Act. 116 The Privacy Act is a vast piece of legislation that
reaches nearly every agency in the federal government and seeks
to protect the individual’s right to privacy in today’s world of easy
access to an abundance of personal information. 117 Congress
enacted this legislation in response to fears of a mounting threat
to personal privacy resulting from the increased use of computers
by the federal government to maintain and retrieve
information. 118
The Privacy Act was passed in 1974 “to promote
accountability, responsibility, legislative oversight, and open
government with respect to the use of computer technology in the
personal information systems and databanks of the Federal
Government.” 119 Its goal is to “strike[ ] a balance between the
individual’s right to privacy and the need for government to
function effectively.” 120 Additionally, the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 amended the original Privacy
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a. Another major statute governing the federal government’s
informational practices is the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). See id. § 552;
Joyce, supra note 23, at 117. FOIA provides for a “judicially enforceable right of
access to agency records except to the extent that” they fall within one of the
enumerated exceptions to the law. Joyce, supra note 23, at 117. Much litigation
surrounds the exceptions and their applicability in certain circumstances. See id. at
118. The exceptions are discretionary, however, so an agency can choose to release a
record that would otherwise be exempt if there is no “legitimate governmental
purpose for withholding” it. Id.
117
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b); Joyce, supra note 23.
118
See Joyce, supra note 23. Joyce’s article also discusses the extensive
legislative history that occurred with this bill. See id. For example, a Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare report “recommended the enactment of a federal
‘Code of Fair Information Practices’ for all automated personal data systems.” Id. at
119. This Code had five main principles:
[T]here should be no records whose very existence is secret, an individual
must be able to discover what information about him is in a record and how
it is used, an individual must be able to prevent information collected for
one purpose from being used for another purpose without his consent, an
individual must be able to correct or amend erroneous information, and any
organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Id. All of those suggestions would eventually be placed into the Privacy Act in some
form. Id.
119
Judith Beth Prowda et al., A Lawyer’s Ramble Down the Information
Superhighway, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 744 (1995) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at
6916 (1974)).
120
Gregory R. Firehock, The Increased Invulnerability of Incorrect Records
Maintained by Law Enforcement Agencies: Doe v. FBI, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1509,
1512 (1992).
116
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Act. 121 “The purpose of th[is new] amendment was to regulate
the use of data-matching procedures in federal agencies.” 122
The Privacy Act provides in pertinent part that “[n]o agency
shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of
records by any means of communication to any person, or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with
the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains.” 123 While this is the main crux of the Privacy Act,
defined terms in the statute refine its meaning. “Agency” is
defined as “any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or
other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency.” 124 “Individual” is defined as “a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for

Prowda et al., supra note 119, at 745.
Id. Data-matching occurs when government files are compared, as “a costefficient way to allocate public resources and detect waste, fraud, and abuse of
government programs.” Id. at 745–46. The Matching Act establishes a procedure for
giving notice, and requiring reporting by the government. Id. at 746.
123
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011). The Privacy Act also provides individuals
with access to their records and the opportunity to correct it if it is wrong. It
provides:
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall (1) upon request by
any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining
to him which is contained in the system, permit him . . . to review the
record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form
comprehensible to him . . . [and] (2) permit the individual to request
amendment of a record pertaining to him . . . .
Id. § 552a(d)(1)–(2).
124
Id. § 552(f)(1) (emphasis added). Section 552a(a)(1) says “the term ‘agency’
means agency as defined in section 552(e) of this title.” Id. § 552a(a)(1). This is an
incorrect cite that should refer to 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), which provides the definition
that is cited in the above text. However, even this section refers the reader to a third
section, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). See id. § 552(f)(1). That section states:
“agency” means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does
not include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the
governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the
government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of
section 552 of this title—(E) agencies composed of representatives of the
parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes
determined by them; (F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied
territory . . . .
5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
121
122
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permanent residence.” 125 Therefore, the Privacy Act does not
cover foreign nationals or business entities. 126 In addition,
“record,” is defined as
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an
individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not
limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history,
and criminal or employment history and that contains his
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice
print or a photograph. 127

Another pertinent definition is “system of records,” defined as “a
group of any records under the control of any agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular
assigned to the individual.” 128
Congress also fashioned two types of exceptions to the
Privacy Act: general and specific. General exceptions include any
system of records that is “maintained by the Central Intelligence
Agency” (“CIA”) and any system of records maintained by any
agency that enforces criminal laws. 129 This includes records
maintained by police, “prosecutors, courts, correctional,
probation, pardon, or parole authorities” if the information
contained in the record is gathered to identify criminal offenders,
to investigate a crime, or to otherwise enforce the law. 130
In addition, the Privacy Act provides for specific exemptions,
two of which are relevant for this Note. First, records that are
“investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of
determining
suitability,
eligibility,
or
qualifications
for . . . military service,” can be exempted from coverage under
Second, “evaluation material used to
the Privacy Act. 131
determine potential for promotion in the armed services” is
exempt, but only to the extent that the name of the individual
who provided the information would be disclosed, even though
the government promised that it would not be disclosed. 132
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a)(2).
See Joyce, supra note 23, at 125.
§ 552a(a)(4).
Id. § 552a(a)(5).
Id. § 552a(j).
Id. § 552a(j)(2).
Id. § 552a(k)(5) (emphasis added).
Id. § 552a(k)(7) (emphasis added).
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Violations of the Privacy Act may result in criminal penalties
for the responsible employee or officer. The criminal penalties
are triggered when
[a]ny officer or employee of an agency, who by virtue of his
employment or official position, has possession of, or access to,
agency records which contain individually identifiable
information the disclosure of which is prohibited by this [Act],
and who knowing that disclosure of the specific material is so
prohibited, willfully discloses the material in any manner to any
person or agency not entitled to receive it. 133

That officer or employee is guilty of a misdemeanor and can be
fined up to $5,000. 134 Essentially, officers or employees of an
agency cannot willfully release records that they know are
protected by the Privacy Act to parties not entitled to receive
those records. The same penalties are also operative if an officer
or employee “willfully maintains a system of records without
meeting the notice requirements.” 135 This sanction flows from
the Privacy Act’s goal of preventing secret systems of records
because the public has a right to know about the very existence of
such a system. 136 Additionally, “[a]ny person who knowingly and
willfully requests or obtains any record concerning an individual
from an agency under false pretenses” is subject to the same
criminal liability. 137 This is presumably to prevent someone from
posing as an individual to receive access to that individual’s
records. 138 The criminal provisions of the Act do not give rise to a
civil cause of action against the employee or officer and are solely
penal in nature. Therefore, the individual must pursue a
common law action for invasion of privacy if a third party has
wrongfully acquired access to their records. 139
The Privacy Act also provides for civil remedies against
federal agencies. 140 These claims are allowed if the agency “fails
Id. § 552a(i)(1).
Id.
135
Id. § 552a(i)(2).
136
See Joyce, supra note 23, at 161.
137
§ 552a(i)(3).
138
See Joyce, supra note 23, at 161.
139
See id.
140
§ 552a(g). An agency is defined by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f) and would include
entities such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 552(f). The remedies
available include attorney fees and costs, injunctive relief, and damages. See id.
§ 552a(g)(4)–(5).
133
134
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to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse
effect on an individual.” 141 If any of these provisions are violated,
the individual can bring a civil action against the agency in the
district courts of the United States. 142 For actions brought under
§ 552a(g)(1)(D), an individual may recover actual damages, and
any individual so entitled will receive a minimum of $1,000. 143 In
addition, an individual can recover attorney fees and the costs of
the action from the United States. 144 For the individual to
recover, however, the court must determine that the “agency
acted in a manner which was intentional or willful.” 145
II. THE APPLICATION OF FERES TO THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE
APPARENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
With the expansion of the Feres doctrine into other areas
beyond the FTCA, the circuit courts appear to be split on whether
this doctrine applies to claims brought by members of the armed
services against the United States government for violations of
the Privacy Act. Part A describes, in detail, the two cases, Uhl v.
Swanstrom 146 and Cummings v. Department of the Navy, 147 that
Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
Civil remedies are also available when any agency (A) makes a
determination under subsection (d)(3) of this section not to amend an
individual’s record in accordance with his request, or fails to make such
review in conformity with that subsection; (B) refuses to comply with an
individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section; [or] (C) fails to
maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness
in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or
opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be made on the
basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is
adverse to the individual.
Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A)–(C). This Note focuses on when the records are released to
outside parties and does not deal with amendment or review of such records, so
these sections are not pertinent for the purposes of this Note but complete the list of
available remedies.
142
Id. § 552a(g)(1).
143
Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). If the action is brought under § 552a(g)(1)(A), the court
may order injunctive relief and “order the agency to amend the individual’s record.”
Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A). If the action is brought under § 552a(g)(1)(B), then “the court
may enjoin the agency from withholding records and order the production” of those
records to the individual. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A).
144
Id. § 552a(g)(4)(B).
145
Id. § 552a(g)(4).
146
79 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 1996).
147
279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
141

CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)

2011]

7/14/2011 4:15 PM

FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT

333

considered the issue and took differing positions on the
application of Feres to the Privacy Act. Part B identifies the
normative arguments for and against the continued use of the
Feres doctrine and its application to the Privacy Act.
A.

Should Feres Bar Privacy Act Claims by Members of the
Military? The Circuits Disagree

1.

Uhl v. Swanstrom—The Eighth Circuit Bars Privacy Act
Claims

The issue in Uhl v. Swanstrom was whether members of the
military could bring Privacy Act claims. 148 Kenneth Uhl was a
dual-status employee in the Iowa Air National Guard
(“IANG”). 149 As a dual-status employee, Uhl was a full-time civil
engineer at the IANG base and a part-time IANG member. 150 To
continue working as a civil servant, he needed to remain eligible
for military service. 151 On June 9, 1988, a medical evaluation
board declared Uhl mentally unfit for worldwide military
service. 152 Consequently, he was removed from his employment
as a civil engineer with the IANG. 153 Uhl then contested his
discharge through the procedures provided by the military. 154
Uhl filed a complaint with the Department of Defense Office of
the Inspector General (the “Inspector”), which investigated. 155
The Inspector concluded that the “process leading to Plaintiff’s
discharge [was] flawed and the decision to discharge plaintiff
[was] inappropriate and invalid.” 156 The Inspector “recommended
that [Uhl] be reinstated to the positions he would have occupied
had he not had a break in [his] service.” 157 Uhl filed a claim with
the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records, which
agreed with the Inspector’s recommendations and also
recommended that his records be “expunged of all references to

Uhl, 79 F.3d at 752.
Id. at 753.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Uhl v. Swanstrom, 876 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (N.D. Iowa 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d
751 (8th Cir. 1996).
153
Uhl, 79 F.3d at 753.
154
Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1548.
155
Uhl, 79 F.3d at 753.
156
Id.
157
Id.
148
149
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the medical disqualification.” 158 Notwithstanding these findings,
the IANG refused to reinstate Uhl. 159 After the state court
dismissed Uhl’s claim because of the Feres doctrine, Uhl filed the
federal action. 160
In the federal action, Uhl alleged that the Department of the
Air Force failed to accurately maintain his records and inserted
incorrect information without notifying or corroborating with
him. 161 He also maintained that defendants distributed that
incorrect information “with the express purpose of injuring Uhl’s
reputation.” 162 The district court considered all of Uhl’s claims
and concluded that his Privacy Act claims were barred by the
The court said, “[h]owever, even
statute of limitations. 163
if . . . the statute of limitations had not run before Uhl filed suit,
Uhl’s Privacy Act claim also runs afoul of the Feres doctrine.” 164
The court concluded that all of the claims in Uhl’s amended
complaint were barred by the Feres doctrine. 165
The district court applied a two-step multifactor test and the
“incident to service” test to determine if the doctrine should be
applied. 166 The multifactor test looked at “(1) whether there is a
relevant relationship between the service member’s activity and
the military service, and (2) whether military discipline will be
impeded if the challenged conduct is litigated in a civil action.” 167
The court concluded that these claims were incident to service
Id.
Id. Plaintiff also filed an administrative claim under the FTCA with the
Department of the Air Force, which was denied. Id.
160
Id.
161
Uhl v. Swanstrom, 876 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (N.D. Iowa 1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d
751.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 1561.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1564–65. Uhl had urged the court to use the two-step multifactor test.
Id. at 1565.
167
Id. at 1564. Three factors are used to determine if there is a relevant
relationship, including “the duty status of the service member, the location of the
injury, and the nature of the activity.” Id. at 1564–65. The district court discussed at
length the Eighth Circuit decision in Watson v. Arkansas National Guard, 886 F.2d
1004, 1010–11 (8th Cir. 1989), which provided exceptions to the application of the
Feres doctrine. These exceptions include judicial review of the constitutionality of a
statute and claims for limited judicial review of final agency action. See Wood v.
United States, 968 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1992); Watson, 886 F.2d at 1010–11. Here,
the court decided that neither of these exceptions applied to make these claims
justiciable. See Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1567.
158
159
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and satisfied the multifactor test. 168 Therefore, the claims were
nonjusticiable under the Feres doctrine because they involved
the “review of a discrete intraservice [sic] personnel decision
involving an assessment of an individual’s military qualifications
for world-wide service.” 169 Thus, as the court noted in the first
sentence of its decision, “[t]his case is a stark and troublesome
reminder that the law does not always provide a remedy for
The Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal,
every wrong.” 170
approving “the district court’s interpretation of the law regarding
the Feres doctrine and its application to the facts of the present
case.” 171
2.

Cummings v. Department of the Navy—The D.C. Circuit
Allows Privacy Act Claims

The court in Cummings v. Department of the Navy also
considered whether the Feres doctrine bars Privacy Act claims,
and this case stands in stark contrast to Uhl. 172 Mary Louise
Cummings, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, was
assigned to a flight squadron in Florida to begin training on the
Strike Fighter Attack 18 (the “F/A-18”). 173 After about seven
months of training, the Navy assembled a Field Naval Aviator
Evaluation Board (“FNAEB”) “to assess her flying skills and
The FNAEB recommended that the Navy
potential.” 174
terminate Cummings’ flying status due to a failure to meet flight
safety standards after four serious errors. 175 Notwithstanding
Uhl, 876 F. Supp. at 1568.
Id. at 1570.
170
Id. at 1547.
171
Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 1996).
172
279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
173
Id. at 1052. Cummings was one of the nation’s first female Naval aviators.
See M.I.T. Humans and Automation Lab, MASS. INST. OF TECH.,
http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/people.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
The F/A-18 is more commonly known as the Hornet. See Cummings, 279 F.3d at
1052.
174
Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1052–53.
175
Id. at 1053. The errors included (1) aligning her aircraft with the wrong
runway, (2) “violat[ing] Navy procedures governing deployment of landing gear
while flying,” (3) an inability to correctly position her aircraft “during . . . simulated
air-to-air combat mission, which resulted in poor tactical performance,” and
(4) creating a dangerous flight pattern while flying in formation, causing another
pilot to take evasive action. Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 5. This decision was
made after examining the records from her four training flights and hearing
testimony from her commanding officers and flight instructors. Cummings, 279 F.3d
168
169
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this conclusion, Cummings retained her flight status and
While
continued to train under the same command. 176
Cummings was training, the Navy let an author “follow specific
squadron personnel without their knowledge as they proceeded
throughout the [Hornet] training program” as research for a book
about fighter pilot training. 177 The book starred a character that
Cummings alleged was based on her because it included “specific
details and direct quotes from her negative [FNAEB] report.” 178
Consequently, “her military and civilian career prospects ha[d]
been severely damaged” and “she . . . suffered severe mental
distress, embarrassment, and humiliation, both personally and
professionally.” 179 Cummings sued for violations of the Privacy
Act, and the district court dismissed her case because it found
the Feres doctrine barred her claims. 180 Specifically, the court
feared that the possibility that “ ‘every time a serviceman were
demoted or saddled with less than a perfect performance rating
he could resort to the courthouse’ could be a very real one if
Privacy Act suits were not subject to the Feres doctrine.” 181
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit disagreed
with the district court and ultimately concluded that Feres did
not bar claims under the Privacy Act. 182 The court began with
the Privacy Act itself and considered Congress’s language. The
court decided that the statute was unambiguous and, thus, that
the plain language controlled. 183 The court determined Congress
used explicit language that identified the Privacy Act as applying
to military departments and provided exceptions for some
military activities, concluding, therefore, that Congress did not
at 1053. It was recommended that she retain her flight status, but under a different
administrative command. See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 76,
77 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
176
Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053.
177
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 78).
178
Id.
179
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d
at 78).
180
See Cummings, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
181
Id. at 82 (quoting Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
182
See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1058.
183
Id. at 1054. The court started with the presumption that Congress means
what it says in the statute and said, “When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” Id. at 1053–54
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 254 (1992)).
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intend for the courts to create additional exceptions. 184 The court
did not stop there, however. It next addressed the argument that
Congress was not explicit in shielding the Privacy Act from the
Feres doctrine, even though Congress knew that the Feres
doctrine existed. 185 The court found that Congress has no reason
to “insulate” the Privacy Act from the Feres doctrine because, at
the time that the Privacy Act was enacted, the doctrine had not
been expanded beyond the context of the FTCA. 186 Applying
these rationales, 187 the court concluded that although the
judiciary should not get involved in military matters under many
circumstances, “Congress clearly enlisted the federal courts to
inquire into potential military violations of the Privacy Act.” 188
Allowing recovery in these circumstances would not create a race
to the courthouse by members of the military, as the district
court feared, because the Privacy Act only provides a remedy if a
“military department has unlawfully released the performance
rating and if the claimant establishes that she was injured as a
result.” 189
3.

The Eastern District of New York Allows Privacy Act Claims

Recently, this apparent circuit split was recognized by the
Eastern District of New York in MacQuill v. Killian, which sided
with the D.C. Circuit in allowing military personnel claims to be
brought under the Privacy Act. 190 James R. MacQuill was a
master sergeant in the New York Air National Guard (“NYANG”)
and was employed as a warehouse materials handler. 191 Killian
sent a request to a local police department “seeking information
regarding the status of MacQuill’s driver’s license” and “any
information [regarding] . . . any other matter involving Sgt.
MacQuill, civil or criminal.” 192 In the request, Killian also stated
that MacQuill lied to the National Guard, disclosed an employer
184
Id. at 1054–55; see 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5) (West 2011) (military service
exemption); id. § 552a(k)(7) (armed services exemption).
185
Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1055.
186
Id. The court applied the maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ispa lex—
“when reason for law ceases, so does law itself”—because none of the rationales of
the Feres doctrine were applicable there. Id. at 1055–56.
187
See discussion supra Part I.A; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
188
Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1056–57 (emphasis omitted).
189
Id. at 1057.
190
MacQuill v. Killian, No. 07-CV-1566, at 11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).
191
Id. at 2. MacQuill’s wife was a lieutenant colonel in the NYANG. Id.
192
Id. at 2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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meeting, named witnesses, disclosed MacQuill’s social security
number, and asserted that MacQuill drove illegally because he
did not have a valid driver’s license, and therefore, jeopardized
the safety of other National Guard members on the base.193
Killian wrote a similar memorandum to another police
department, but it refused his request. 194 Impervious to this
rejection, Killian filed a Freedom of Information Law request
with the police department, which rebuffed his request, saying
that it was an “unlawful invasion of privacy.” 195 Nevertheless,
Killian somehow obtained the records that he wanted, records
that pertained to domestic disputes between MacQuill and his
Subsequently, these records were disseminated to
wife. 196
various military officials, state officials adjudicating a nonjudicial punishment action, and MacQuill’s military defense
counsel representing him in that disciplinary action—who then
had to withdraw from representation. 197 The records were also
sent to the officials adjudicating MacQuill’s pending employment
adverse action proceedings and to off-base civilian addresses. 198
MacQuill alleged various Privacy Act violations resulting from
the dissemination of his records. 199 On a motion to dismiss, the
court agreed with the D.C. Circuit and held that MacQuill’s
claims were not barred by the Feres doctrine because “Congress’s
decision to exclude certain military documents . . . from
protection under the Privacy Act would have been superfluous
and redundant if the service members were barred from bringing
suit under the Act.” 200 Therefore, the court concluded, “Congress
clearly intended to permit Privacy Act suits by service members
against the military.” 201

Id. at 3.
See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, MacQuill, No. 07-CV1566, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007).
195
MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 3.
196
Id.
197
See id. at 4.
198
Id. at 3–4.
199
See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 194, at 7.
The court recognized the circuit split on whether the Feres doctrine barred Privacy
Act claims. MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 12.
200
MacQuill, No. 07-CV-1566, at 11–12.
201
Id. at 12.
193
194
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B. Normative Arguments for and Against the Feres Doctrine
There are arguments both for and against expansion of the
Feres doctrine to bar claims under the Privacy Act. Since its
inception, the Feres doctrine has been widely disparaged by
commentators, including those serving in the military, as being
unnecessary and having unintended results for those affected by
the inability to recover. 202 On the other hand, members of the
Department of Justice and commanders of the armed services
have applauded the doctrine and stressed its benefits for the
country. 203
There are three main arguments in favor of the continued
application and expansion of the Feres doctrine to Privacy Act
claims: (1) the desire to stay out of military discipline and
decisionmaking; (2) the availability of statutorily prescribed
remedies; and (3) the failure of Congress to take any action to
First, the intrusion of the
overrule the Feres doctrine. 204
judiciary into military decisionmaking and discipline would be a
detriment to the effectiveness of the military in accomplishing its
missions. 205 This is a powerful argument that has captured the
Supreme Court, which adopted it as their foremost rationale for
preserving the doctrine. 206 High-ranking officers in the armed
services and members of the Department of Justice advanced the
argument that the relationship between soldiers and their
superiors is a unique and special one. 207 American courts and
Congress recognized the “unique nature” of military service and
have been “reluctan[t] to intervene in military affairs” because of
the potential disruption. 208 For example, litigation is highly
disruptive and inherently divisive, which goes against the
cohesion that is necessary in the military. 209 As Major General

See infra notes 228–247 and accompanying text.
See generally The Feres Doctrine; An Examination of This Military Exception
to the Federal Torts Claim Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=493
[hereinafter Hearing].
204
See infra notes 205–227 and accompanying text.
205
See, e.g., Brou, supra note 37, at 53–59.
206
See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987); United States v.
Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987); discussion supra Part I.A.
207
See Hearing, supra note 203.
208
Id. (testimony of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S.).
209
Id.
202
203
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Nolan Sklute 210 indicated, “certain absolutes” are required for
unit cohesiveness, including “strict obedience to orders; total
loyalty to one’s organization, one’s service and our Nation; total
loyalty up and down the chain of command; complete trust
among and between members of one’s organization; and
discipline.” 211 If lawsuits were permitted, that cohesiveness,
loyalty, trust, and obedience to orders would be for naught. 212
Litigation is also time-consuming and “assures this result:
military plaintiffs and witnesses will be summoned to attend
depositions and trials, and they will have to take time from their
regularly assigned duties to confer with counsel and
investigators.” 213 This poses a problem because our troops are
stationed around the world and “may have to be recalled from
distant posts,” which is expensive and difficult. 214 Such a result
would be disruptive to our national security and defense because
national security demands that our fighting forces are “ready to
perform their duties at all times.” 215 It would also be disruptive
because “[c]ommanders and other military members would . . . be
deposed and summoned into court to justify their decisions.” 216 If
litigation were allowed, it would involve the judiciary in an area
where it has “no specialized knowledge of [the] unique challenges
and requirements” of military service, which “would undermine
[military leaders’] ability to train the force effectively.” 217
Additionally, military leaders fear that such a practice would
allow the court to second guess low level decisions and engender

Major General Nolan Sklute is a former United States Air Force Judge
Advocate General, the chief military attorney for that branch. See Biographies:
Major General Nolan Sklute, U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/information/
bios/bio.asp?bioID=7160 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). He was responsible for
providing a full range of legal services to the Air Force and supervised over 1,500
attorneys, military and civilian. See id.
211
Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Nolan Sklute, Major General, Retired
and Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force).
212
See id. (testimony of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the
U.S.).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. (testimony of Nolan Sklute, Major General, Retired and Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Air Force).
217
Id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army).
210
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the belief that no order or decision is final until a civilian court
has ruled. 218
The second argument in favor of the Feres doctrine is that
there are statutorily prescribed remedies and procedures that
military plaintiffs can take advantage of to recover for their
injuries and vindicate their rights. For example, Congress
enacted the UCMJ, which criminalizes acts such as “[f]ailure to
follow orders” or “conduct unbecoming an officer” to preserve
discipline and order in the military. 219 In addition, military
plaintiffs can take other “administrative, nonjudicial and judicial
courses of action.” 220 The “chain of command and the uniform
system of accountability” are in place so that the rights of service
members are protected without having to resort to litigation.221
The chain of command as well as the criminal investigative
services, inspector generals, safety officers, judge advocates, and
the article 138 process hold military personnel accountable. 222
These processes, combined with the comprehensive benefit
system for both soldiers and veterans, are sufficient and provide
another reason why the Court should retain the Feres doctrine
and expand it to cover Privacy Act claims. 223
Finally, Congress has had sixty years to overrule the
Supreme Court by clarifying the meaning of the FTCA and other
statutes such as the Privacy Act but has failed to do so. Since
this is a question of statutory interpretation, “Congress can

218
See id.; see also id. (testimony of Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral and
Commandant, U.S. Navy) (“Disruption of military operations would almost be
inevitable, as service members might elect to weigh obedience to orders and
compliance with directives with contemplated litigation to achieve an objective more
to their liking or interests.”).
219
Id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army).
220
Id. (testimony of Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral and Commandant,
U.S. Navy).
221
Id.
222
See id. (testimony of John Altenberg, Major General, Retired, and Assistant
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army); see also id. (testimony of Mr. Eugene Fidell,
Counsel, Feldesman, Tucker, Leifer, Fidell, & Bank, LLP). In simple terms, article
138 is a procedure for soldiers to complain about the actions of their superior
officers. See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006); Robert W. Ayers, Clarifying the Article 138
Complaint Process, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2008, at 26–29 (describing the article 138
process from when a soldier submits a complaint, through the investigation, to the
eventual decision).
223
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1987); Stencel Aero
Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
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correct [an] inaccurate . . . interpretation[ ].” 224 As the Supreme
Court originally acknowledged in Feres, 225 “if we misinterpret the
[FTCA], at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.” 226 The
Court looked at this inaction again saying, “Nor has Congress
changed this standard in the close to 40 years since it was
articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, Congress
‘possesses a ready remedy’ to alter a misinterpretation of its
intent.” 227 Therefore, the Supreme Court has blatantly suggested
that Congress should correct the interpretation if it is wrong, and
Congress has not taken any action.
Nevertheless, many commentators and those affected by the
doctrine denigrated the doctrine and called for it to be judicially
overturned or legislatively repealed. 228 Critics advanced three
main arguments for overturning the Feres doctrine and not
expanding it to bar claims such as those under the Privacy Act:
(1) the doctrine is not grounded in any statute and should be
overruled; (2) the Feres doctrine distorts the risk-reducing
benefits of liability; and (3) civilians are able to sue for injuries
from military actions. 229 First, critics argue that the doctrine is
not grounded in the FTCA and has distorted what Congress
intended by enacting the FTCA and other statutes. 230 For
instance, the FTCA and Privacy Act both provide exceptions for
when the military is engaged in combat operations or for when
records are used for promotion purposes, and these are sufficient
to avoid any interference with military decisionmaking. 231 The
effect of these exceptions on military decisionmaking and

See Brou, supra note 37, at 74.
340 U.S. 135 (1950). Congress has even held hearings, taking testimony from
a variety of military officers, lawyers, and people affected by the Feres doctrine, but
Congress has never taken action. See Hearing, supra note 203.
226
Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
227
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 138). The Court also
noted that Congress considered but did not enact legislation that would have
allowed members of the armed forces to file medical malpractice suits against the
federal government. Id. at 688 n.6.
228
See infra notes 229–247 and accompanying text.
229
See infra notes 230–244 and accompanying text.
230
See Turley, supra note 64. See generally Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to
Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV.
93 (1990).
231
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5), (7) (West 2011) (Privacy Act exemptions); Feres, 340
U.S. at 146 (interpreting the FTCA to exclude injuries “incident to service”).
224
225
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discipline is unknown, however, because the Supreme Court has
always barred these claims. 232
Additionally, critics believe there should be less concern
about the effect on discipline because in contrast to the beliefs
underlying many of the judicial decisions, coercive discipline—
defined as the “blind obedience to orders to avoid punishment”—
is the “least effective means of motivating soldiers to do their
duty.” 233 The real motivation is “to protect their comrades and to
get home safely.” 234 Furthermore, the military “de-emphasizes
discipline as a major component of combat leadership,” by
requiring that soldiers disobey illegal orders and take
initiative. 235 Therefore, there is no need to preserve discipline by
avoiding lawsuits since the specter of possible lawsuits will not
affect discipline. 236 Moreover, overturning Feres would not
interfere with military decisionmaking because claims of
negligence that can happen in civilian life—such as medical
malpractice and traffic accidents—are barred claims that do not
seem likely to have any influence on the types of decisions that
In addition, repealing this
military commanders make. 237
doctrine should not affect military commanders’ decisions
because they would still be free from personal liability. 238
Second, critics argue that the Feres doctrine distorts the riskreducing benefits that liability for wrongful actions creates. 239
Because the military and, by extension, the United States
government, are not liable for the violation of a person’s rights or
for negligent actions, the federal government has expanded into
many collateral areas where it can compete with private
companies at a much lower cost due to this lack of liability. 240 As
such, there is no incentive for the United States government to
232
See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP).
233
Tomes, supra note 230, at 108.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 109.
236
Id. at 110.
237
See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP).
238
See id. (testimony of Eugene Fidell, Counsel, Feldesman, Tucker, Leifer,
Fidell, & Bank LLP).
239
See Turley, supra note 64, at 46–47.
240
See id. at 39.
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put procedures in place to avoid risk because it does not feel the
For example, the military
financial cost of its actions. 241
maintains long-term confinement facilities, and the court has
extended the Feres doctrine to claims brought by members of the
armed services held in these prisons. 242 By doing so, “the courts
have effectively cut off the most significant pressure for reform in
correctional institutions.” 243 Therefore, critics argue, the Feres
doctrine should be abrogated, because abrogating the doctrine
would make the federal government more risk-adverse and would
better protect servicepersons.
A third argument made by critics to repeal the Feres doctrine
is that civilians can sue for injuries resulting from military
actions. There is no evidence that civilian recovery, uninhibited
by the Feres doctrine, has led to a significant increase in claims
or affected military decisionmaking in any way. 244
Moreover, these concerns have led to constitutional
questions of whether the Supreme Court overstepped its bounds
in creating this doctrine. The Feres doctrine has no basis in the
text of the FTCA or Privacy Act “and constitutes a judicially
imposed limitation on a right to sue granted by Congress.” 245 In
addition, the Constitution itself expressly gives Congress the
power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
Therefore, the Supreme Court
land and naval Forces.” 246
arguably exceeded its power under the Constitution to secondguess what Congress did in the area of military governance by
not following the language of the statute. Since the judiciary did
this “at the behest of the Executive,” Congress must act to
“restore the appropriate Constitutional balance.” 247

Id.
Id. at 35–37. Other examples given include the military’s expansion into
transportation, recreation activities, and a medical system that goes beyond that
necessary for combat operations. Id. at 40–46. All of these areas can be operated at a
lower cost than a private company because the military is “not . . . forced to
internalize the costs of accidents and negligence.” Id. at 39.
243
Id. at 37–38.
244
See Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP) (giving a hypothetical case). But see Turley,
supra note 64, at 49–50.
245
Id. (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer &
Feld, LLP).
246
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
247
Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of Daniel Joseph, Counsel, Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP).
241
242
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III. UHL AND CUMMINGS IN PERFECT HARMONY
As the Uhl and Cummings cases demonstrate, there are
strong arguments on both sides as to whether the Feres doctrine
should apply to Privacy Act claims brought by members of the
military. On one hand, applying the Feres doctrine would keep
the federal courts out of military affairs since judicial inquiry in
that area will have an adverse impact on military discipline and
effectiveness. 248 Conversely, the court could decline to apply the
doctrine because the Feres doctrine is not applicable to claims
under the Privacy Act since military personnel deserve a remedy,
and no other recovery is available. 249
Neither of these
approaches is ideal because they are based on a Hobson’s choice:
Providing members of the Armed Forces with a Privacy Act
remedy when they have been injured or putting military
discipline and effectiveness seriously at risk.
A workable
solution, however, might appear if the courts in those cases had
asked one additional question: Who was the recipient of the
released information?
A test could be applied to the facts of each case to determine
if the Feres doctrine is applicable. First, the court should apply
the “incident to service” test to the release of information. If the
information is not incident to service, then the Feres doctrine is
inapplicable and the claim should proceed. Subsequently, if the
release is incident to service, the court should look at the
recipient of the information. If it is released to another member
of the military and kept within the military, then the rationales
of the Feres doctrine apply to bar such claims. If, however, the
information is released to someone outside of the military
command structure, then the rationales of the Feres doctrine are
inapplicable and the claims should be allowed. Any allowable
claims, of course, would also be subject to the limitations of the
Privacy Act, which require that the release be unlawful and that
the plaintiff show an adverse effect. 250
Part A of this Section discusses why this test should be used
to apply the Feres doctrine to Privacy Act claims that arise as a
result of information being released within the military itself.
Part B demonstrates that the doctrine need not be applied to
248
249
250

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).
Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (West 2011).
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information that is released to outside parties who are not
subject to the military command structure.
A.

Applying Feres to Claims Within the Military Command
Structure

Claims that arise within the command structure of the
military are barred if they are incident to service because they
invoke the rationales of the Feres doctrine and administrative
remedies are available for military personnel to vindicate their
rights. 251 First, the “incident to service” test should be used to
determine whether the claims are within the military command
structure because the “ ‘incident to service’ test . . . provides a
line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less
extensive inquiry into military matters.” 252 This test helps the
court decide if it should even become involved with a release of
information because it asks if the scope of the release was
something that arose out of or was in the course of military
duty. 253 On the other hand, if the claim is not incident to service,
then the Feres doctrine is likewise inapplicable and the claim
should be allowed to proceed. 254
After determining that the release of information was
incident to service, 255 the court should then look at the recipient
of the information. If the information was released to another
member of the military, the courts are “ill-equipped to determine
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have” 256 because judges have “no
specialized knowledge of [the] unique challenges and
requirements” of military service and should not interfere. 257 The
rationales of the Feres doctrine would thus apply to bar such
claims.

See infra Part II.
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987).
253
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
254
See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
255
This will arguably occur very frequently since the record itself is often
something that arises out of military service, such as a personnel record.
256
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181, 187 (1962)).
257
Hearing, supra note 203 (testimony of John Altenberg, Major Gen., Retired,
and Assistant Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Army).
251
252
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The Supreme Court has identified many rationales, but the
one that has received the most support is the reluctance to
interfere with military discipline and effectiveness. 258 This
rationale is directly implicated when records are released to
other members of the military because the disruptive nature of a
lawsuit will undermine the need for “immediate compliance with
military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with
no time for debate or reflection.” 259 Therefore, courts should
“hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to
tamper with the established relationship between enlisted
military personnel and their superior officers.” 260 This is exactly
the “type of claim[ ] that, if generally permitted, would involve
the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of
military discipline and effectiveness” 261 because the court would
be conducting an inquiry into whether a particular release fell
under the Privacy Act or if it implicated one of the exceptions in
the Act. 262 Accordingly, a bright-line prohibition of these suits
would prevent extremely disruptive and fractious litigation. 263
In addition, the district court in Cummings acknowledged
that the fear that “every time a serviceman were demoted or
saddled with a less than perfect performance rating he could
resort to the courthouse could be a very real one if Privacy Act
suits were not subject to the Feres doctrine.” 264 This statement is
a slight exaggeration because the record must be released
unlawfully and the plaintiff must show some type of injury. 265
This fear, however, is valid to the extent that it recognizes that
many members of the military would then be able to sue if others
found out about their performance rating.
Courts should also bar Privacy Act suits when information is
released to other members of the military because Congress has
See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 684 (1987).
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
260
Id.
261
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
262
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)–(k) (West 2011).
263
See Hearing, supra note 203 (statement of Hon. Paul Harris, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
264
Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
265
Id. at 1057. Section § 552a(g)(1)(D) requires an adverse effect, which may
include financial injury. See id. at 1053. For example, in Cummings, the plaintiff
alleged that she had suffered serious consequences to her career and that she
suffered from humiliation, embarrassment, and severe mental distress. See id.
258
259
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“establish[ed] a comprehensive internal system of justice to
regulate military life, taking into account the special patterns
that define the military structure.” 266 While these remedies are
not often used and are frequently ineffective, they do exist and
provide another reason for the courts to bar these cases. 267 These
remedies include article 138 claims, 268 which allow soldiers to
complain about the decisions of his or her commanding
officers. 269 Article 138 provides a remedy for the plaintiff and
resolves grievances without involving civilian courts. 270 Some
commentators have posited that asking a “commander . . . before
sending [a] complaint through the chain of command, [is] hardly
a confidence-inspiring procedure when the commander is the one
who committed the [wrong].” 271 While the article 138 process
may not be the most effective way of seeking redress, it still
provides a process for seeking redress that is sufficient to keep
civilian courts out of military affairs because it addresses the
exact concerns with which courts have been reluctant to
interfere. 272
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (quoting Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983)).
267
See Ayers, supra note 222, at 25 (noting that article 138 claims are “not often
sought” and as a result, “many junior Judge Advocates (JAs) are unaware of how to
properly counsel a Soldier”).
268
See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006). This section codifies the Uniform Code of Military
Justice Article 138 claims and states,
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his
commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding
officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned
officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the
complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained
of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true
statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.
Id. Each branch of the military also has a board for the correction of records, which
would satisfy the other parts of the Privacy Act, and allow recovery and injunctive
relief for inaccurate records. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552 (West 2011) (establishing a
corrections board); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1) (West 2011) (providing civil
remedies for violations of the Privacy Act). This part of the Privacy Act is not
discussed in this Note, but the Feres doctrine should apply as well because there is
already a system in place.
269
See 10 U.S.C. § 938.
270
See id.
271
Tomes, supra note 230, at 115.
272
See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983). The Court relied on the
article 138 process to dispose of the constitutional tort claims that were brought by
the petitioners in that case. Id. at 302–04. The Court acknowledged that Congress
266

CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)

2011]

FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT

7/14/2011 4:15 PM

349

The Cummings 273 court also identified as part of its rationale
that the Privacy Act must provide for the coverage of military
personnel because it does not explicitly exclude them. 274
Similarly, although the FTCA likewise did not expressly exclude
claims by members of the military, the court nevertheless barred
the claims. 275 Due to the similarity between the Privacy Act and
the FTCA—the language used, the lack of specification, and
certain enumerated exceptions—there is no reason to think that
the claims should also not be barred unless there is a clear
statement by Congress. 276 As noted by the dissent in Cummings,
“Feres itself represents a refusal to read statutes with their
ordinary sweep. The unique setting of the military led the Feres
Court to resist bringing the armed services within the coverage of
a remedial statute in the absence of an express Congressional
command.” 277 Moreover, Congress has possessed a ready remedy
for over fifty years and has never acted to restrict the use of the
Feres doctrine. 278
B. Allowing Claims if Records Are Released to Outside Parties
Although the rationales of the Feres doctrine are clearly
applicable when the records are released to other members of the
military, they seem less relevant when the records are released
to outside parties. Therefore, when records are released to
outside parties, claims should be allowed for three reasons.
First, there is no impact on military discipline or effectiveness
because the records released are not being used for any internal
military purposes, whether or not they are exempt under the
Privacy Act. 279 Under the Privacy Act, if records were released to
an outside party, the court would not be getting involved solely in
internal military decisions and procedures, but would be looking

has control over the military and has enacted statutes regulating military life by
creating a judicial system that should not be interfered with by the judiciary. Id. at
302.
273
279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
274
Id. at 1054–55.
275
Id. at 1055–56.
276
Id. at 1058 (Williams, J., dissenting).
277
Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 470 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
278
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
279
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)–(k) (West 2011) (exempting from coverage
information that is used for investigation or promotion decisions).
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at military decisions to release records to the public. If records
are kept within the military, even if the recipient is not entitled
to see them, there is much less damage than if the recipient is a
book author or newspaper who could be widely disseminate those
records into the public arena. The military is a specialized
culture and community, 280 which has its own procedures in place
to ensure that those affected receive a remedy, 281 but the secrecy
of that community is pierced once records are released to an
outside party, opening the door for courts to examine the
decision. Because the damage to a person will often be greater if
the information is released to the outside world, a proper damage
remedy in the federal courts is appropriate to vindicate the rights
of that person, military or not.
Secondly, these types of suits are unlikely to be sufficiently
related to the person’s service that they “necessarily implicate[ ]
the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably
intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.” 282
Therefore, the release of information by a commanding officer to
an outside party is not likely to get the court involved in military
decisionmaking or discipline. This is because the plaintiff will
not want the information to be released to that outside party and
there will be no valid purpose for the release because the Privacy
Act will prohibit the release. These releases are not likely to be
entangled with any particular military mission, and a judicial
inquiry would therefore be appropriate.
Finally, the other rationales that the Supreme Court has
identified for the Feres doctrine are likewise inapplicable in this
case. These rationales are: (1) a lack of parallel liability for
private individuals; (2) the “ ‘distinctively federal’ relationship
between the United States and its military forces”; and (3) double
recovery. 283 First, the rationale of no parallel liability in the
private sector is inapposite because this statute specifically
applies to private individuals and the Court has rejected that
rationale. 284
280
See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987). See generally Guy
L. Siebold, Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology, 29 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 140
(2001).
281
See 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2006).
282
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691.
283
See Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
284
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–42 (1950). This rationale was
rejected in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955).

CP_Juergens (Do Not Delete)

2011]

FERES AND THE PRIVACY ACT

7/14/2011 4:15 PM

351

Second, even though there is a distinctly federal relationship
between the United States and its military, 285 that relationship is
only implicated when the release is within the military, but not
when it is released to outside parties. Congress is not clear on
whether this law would apply to the military, 286 thus it is up to
the courts to define the application of the Privacy Act to members
of the military. Since the Privacy Act is a federal statute, it
would not subject members of the military to the vagaries of local
law. This makes the Privacy Act more applicable than the FTCA
to military personnel under the rationales of Feres because
recovery would not be based on luck of geographic assignment. 287
In addition, the terms of the Privacy Act are specifically defined
to include the military branches. 288 Thus, in cases of outside
release, the rationale of avoiding results based on local law is
also inapplicable.
Finally, the Court was worried about a double recovery for
members of the military under the FTCA. 289 This is similarly
inapplicable because there is no other provision for recovery by
members of the military unless they obtain one under the
provisions of the Privacy Act. The VA compensation system will
not provide a remedy for violations of the Privacy Act, and
therefore military personnel will not be receiving a windfall if
they recover in a lawsuit. 290 Accordingly, recovery should be
allowed for releases to parties outside of the command structure
of the military because, as Justice Scalia pointed out,
“nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be worse than . . . uniform
nonrecovery [sic].”291

Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
Compare Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1055 (“[O]n its face, the Privacy Act would
appear to permit actions brought by military personnel.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Cummings v. Dep’t of the Navy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C.
2000), rev’d, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), with id. at 1058 (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (“I see neither any greater hint from Congress that Feres should not
govern, nor any indication that Privacy Act damage claims pose less risk of
interference with command relations.”).
287
See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
288
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f)(1) (West 2011).
289
See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
290
See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1056. Compare with Justice Scalia’s dissent in
United States v. Johnson, where he posits that suits under the FTCA should be
allowed regardless of whether the plaintiffs were previously compensated under the
Veterans’ Benefits Act. 481 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 695–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285
286
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The cases previously discussed achieved the right result
within this rubric, but should have made one further factual
distinction—to whom the information was released. Applying
this test to Cummings, Mary Louise Cummings would be allowed
to bring her claims because the release of her information was
not incident to her service and was to an outside party. 292 The
discipline and decisionmaking of the military is not compromised
when the information is released to a book author, and this is the
type of claim that the Privacy Act was intended to protect. 293
Similarly, Uhl was also correctly decided. In that case, the
medical records and other information were only released to
other parts of the military that were deciding if Uhl should be
discharged from his military and civilian positions within the
military. 294 Therefore, the court correctly barred these claims
because of the Feres doctrine. 295 Correspondingly, in MacQuill,
the court correctly allowed the claims under this framework
because the records were released to state officials adjudicating
non-military matters, civilian addresses, and non-military police
departments. 296 The officials and civilians given access to these
records were outside of the military chain of command;
dissemination of the criminal records to these officials was
unlawful under the Privacy Act; and thus the rationales of the
Feres doctrine do not apply. Accordingly, the claims were
properly allowed to proceed because the records were sent to
civilian addresses off-base that were home to both members of
the NYANG and civilians outside of the military command
structure. 297
CONCLUSION
The Feres doctrine has become an important part of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the realm of military affairs. 298
Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053.
Joyce, supra note 23 (recognizing “the alarming tendency of the government
to put information technology to uses detrimental to individual privacy”). The
author’s name was Robert Gandt and the book he published was Bogeys and
Bandits: Making of a Fighter Pilot. Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1053.
294
Uhl v. Swanstrom, 79 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1996).
295
Id. at 756.
296
MacQuill v. Killian, No. 07-CV-1566, at 3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2008).
297
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 194, at 6
(E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007).
298
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
292
293
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It has been extended from its original application to the FTCA
into a variety of areas—from Bivens claims to Americans with
Disabilities Act claims. 299 The rationales underlying the use of
the doctrine have changed from the lack of parallel liability in
the private sector, double compensation problems, and the
application of state tort law to the military, to the most
important rationale—the effect that allowing claims would have
on military discipline and decisionmaking. 300
The Privacy Act makes it unlawful for agencies to release
records of individuals without proper consent. 301 It provides
some exceptions but seems to apply at least in most instances
across all agencies within the federal government. 302 Civil
remedies including damages and equitable relief are provided,
and criminal sanctions can be imposed for a willful and
intentional breach. 303
The cases discussed, Cummings v. Department of the Navy
and Uhl v. Swanstrom, seem to reflect a disagreement as to
whether to apply the Feres doctrine to claims by members of the
military under the Privacy Act, but are actually in harmony with
each other due to a significant factual distinction—to whom the
information was released. In short, this Note proposes that the
courts first apply the “incident to service” test, and if the release
is incident to the plaintiff’s service, then look at the recipient of
the released information. If the recipient is a member of the
military within its command structure, the claim is properly
barred by the Feres doctrine. But if the information is released to
an outside, civilian party, there is no compelling reason—
military or otherwise—to bar claims. This rationale would help
plaintiffs obtain relief while still respecting military discipline
and decisionmaking.

299
See Cummings, 279 F.3d at 1060–61 & nn.1–5 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases).
300
See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 684 & n.2 (1987).
301
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 2011).
302
Id. § 552a(j)–(k).
303
Id. § 552a(g)(1) (civil penalties); id. § 552a(i)(1) (criminal penalties).

